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INTRODUCTION
Since 1883, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment affords no protection against
private behavior.' The Equal Protection Clause does not
prohibit a private social club from refusing patrons on the
basis of race.2 The Due Process Clause does not guarantee
notice or a hearing before a private utility company shuts off
the electricity to a person's home.3 In fact, with the exception
of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery,
nothing in the Constitution directly limits private behavior;
our founding document, for the most part, constrains state
action only.4 Thus, distinguishing between "state action" and
* John Dorsett Niles, Associate, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP.
** Lauren E. Tribble, Lecturer, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America.
*** Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Associate, Williams & Connolly LLP.
1. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action
of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.").
2. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) ("[T]he operation
of the regulatory scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
does not sufficiently implicate the State in the discriminatory guest policies of
Moose Lodge to make the latter 'state action' within the ambit of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974) ("[Tlhe State
of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with respondent's action in
terminating petitioner's service so as to make respondent's conduct in so doing
attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
4. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837, 843 (1982) (holding
that the First Amendment does not prevent a private school, though publicly
funded, from firing a teacher for espousing a view with which the school's
director disagrees).
885
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"private action" carries enormous import.' This fundamental
distinction defines the Constitution's reach.
Unfortunately, finding a meaningful distinction between
"state action" and "private action" has proven difficult.6 The
Court has considered the problem more than seventy times.
It has defined the Constitution's reach case by case, mostly
through the traditional common-law method of analogical
device, tracing a crooked and often blurry line between action
that is "fairly attributable to the state" and action that is
attributable only to a private person.' Through this method,
the Court has established many lines of state-action cases
over the years: cases involving a government official who acts
within, beyond, or contrary to the official's authority; cases
involving a nongovernmental entity performing a function
traditionally reserved exclusively to the government; cases
involving a symbiotic relationship between the state and a
nongovernmental entity; and so on.8
With each new case, reconciling the outcome with prior
precedent has become increasingly difficult. To decide a new
case using this method, the Court first must choose-and
choose consistently-which of its prior decisions most
resembles the case under review, then resolve the case in
harmony with that selected line of precedent. After years of
this method, state action jurisprudence has become jumbled;
legal commentators regularly describe it as nothing less than
a precedential zoo.' The circumstances are dire;
5. As Professor Charles Black comments, "It is not too much to have said
that the state action problem is the most important problem in American law.
We cannot think about it too much; we ought to talk about it until we settle on a
view both conceptually and functionally right." Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 69, 70 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to
State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J. 745, 769 (1981) (likening a workable distinction between
state action and private action to "at least a piece of the Holy Grail that has
eluded state action theorists for decades"); David H. Topol, Note, Union Shops,
State Action, and the National Labor Relations Act, 101 YALE L.J. 1135, 1142
(1992) ("Making sense of the state action doctrine is not an easy task.").
7. See generally G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State
Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility (pt. 1), 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 333 (1997); id. (pt. 2), 34 HouS. L. REV. 665 (1997) (providing a detailed
history of the Court's state action cases).
8. See, e.g., id.
9. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An
886 [Vol:51
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commentators, even as far back as 1967, have recognized that
"[o]n the cases and on the opinions, 'state action' is a doctrine
in trouble."10 Distinguishing state action from private action
through analogical device is failing.
Much of the problem is attributable to the Court's failure
to explain how its many distinct lines of state action
precedent relate to each other or to articulate which line of
cases governs in each circumstance." There is also
considerable confusion within each line of precedent.' 2 To
bring order to state action jurisprudence, the Court should
Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action
Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 304 (indicating that the Court's
precedent has proven "difficult to apply in practice" and has "done little to
improve either the quality or consistency of state action determinations");
Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085
(1960) ("It is apparent that the Court will be called upon with increasing
urgency to give shape to this protean concept and attempts to establish the
boundaries of state action, based on analyses of [the Court's] cases, will
continue.").
10. Black, supra note 5, at 91. As Professor Black more optimistically
continues, "It is just possible . . . that rescue might be found in the scholarly
commentary." Id.
11. See, e.g., Joan Kane, Note, The Constitutionality of Redlining: The
Potential for Holding Banks Liable as State Actors, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
527, 558 (1993) ("It is impossible to predict which standard will be used by a
court examining the state actor doctrine."). The Court has made inroads. See
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
state or by a person for whom the State is responsible . . . . Second, the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor.
Id. at 936-37.
12. Several commentators have tackled apparent inconsistencies among the
Court's rulings within single lines of precedent. See, e.g., Glenn Abernathy,
Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 375, 378-418 (1958) (explaining the Court's rulings in state-
action cases involving off-duty police officers, leases to private individuals,
private entities performing a "public function," state judicial intervention to aid
private discrimination, and state inaction in preventing private discrimination);
James D. Barnett, What is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 OR. L. REv. 227, nn.47-79 and
accompanying text (1945) (exploring the development of state-action doctrine
involving government officials who act outside the scope of their authority or
contrary to law); Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-34 (1959) (responding to
Herbert Wechsler's charge that many of the state-action cases during the 1950s
were unprincipled by stepping through several cases and reconciling each with
its relevant line of precedent).
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adopt a conceptual structure tying together its many state
action rulings.
This Article proposes an overarching conceptual
structure for distinguishing between state action and private
action in any circumstance where the inquiry arises. Under
the proposed structure, a court would conduct three steps of
analysis. First, it would identify what conduct and whose
conduct the complaint challenges."3 Recognizing that the
state is never wholly removed from any private action," the
court would also identify how the state interacted with the
challenged conduct both before and after the fact. Second, the
court would determine whether the party whose conduct is
challenged is "public" in nature or "private." 5 If the party is
public, its conduct constitutes state action and the inquiry
ends. If the party is private, the court would then proceed to
a third step of analysis. At this step, the court would analyze
how the state interacted with the challenged conduct both
before and after the fact." If, before the fact, the state
encouraged or mandated the specific conduct at issue, or if,
after the fact, the state demonstrated a special relationship
with the challenged conduct, state action exists and the
Constitution applies. If, however, the state merely permitted
the challenged conduct under generally applicable law, state
action does not exist, and the challenged conduct is not
subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Analytically, it must be stressed that this entire inquiry
occurs only at the threshold of constitutional analysis. If a
court holds that state action exists, the court must still
13. See infra Part H.A.
14. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 478 (1962) ("[W]hether the judgment of a court enforces
a voluntary discrimination or compels a no-longer-voluntary discrimination, the
discrimination is private in origin; in both cases it requires a court judgment to
make the discrimination effective."); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987)
[Hiow does one decide whether government is "acting"? The legal test
could in theory depend on whether government agents are involved in
the process. But . .. such a test would be inadequate. State officials
are involved in the enforcement of private contract, tort, and property
law every day, and their involvement does not subject all private
arrangements to constitutional constraints.
Id. at 886.
15. See infra Part HI.B.
16. See infra Part HI.C.
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determine whether the conduct at issue violates the
constitution.
Part I of this article presents the traditional objections to
creating one overarching theory of state action and discusses
the few attempts to create such a theory." Part II presents
the proposed conceptual structure and shows how it is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent.'" Part III defends
the structure, testing it against the scholarly arguments
against developing a comprehensive state action theory.'9
I. PROBLEMS WITH CONCEPTUALIZING THE STATE ACTION
DOCTRINE
Despite near universal acknowledgement that the state
action doctrine is a mess, a number of commentators continue
to argue that the Court should not, or cannot, develop a
comprehensive approach to state action questions that is also
consistent with precedent. Some such commentators object
that the concept of state action is inherently self-defeating;
because the state is involved in all private action, there is no
way to meaningfully separate state from private behavior.
Others argue that developing a comprehensive state action
approach is impossible because the state action inquiry can
arise in limitless factual situations and therefore defies
definition. Still others argue that even if crafting a
conceptual theory of state action were possible, doing so is
inadvisable because such a theory would instruct wrongdoers
how to evade constitutional scrutiny and would underprotect
civil rights and liberties.
This Part of the article presents these objections. It also
outlines the few ways that scholars have attempted to
conceptualize state action, and it considers the extent to
which those attempts confront the objections discussed.
A. Traditional Objections to Conceptualizing the State Action
Doctrine
The primary objection to conceptualizing the state action
doctrine is that the state is so tied up in all action that
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
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separating its conduct from private behavior is impossible."
Searching for state action is therefore meaningless, as are
attempts to develop a conceptual structure for the inquiry.2 1
This argument stresses that, for any legal private behavior,
the state compels, encourages, or at the very least permits the
behavior before it occurs. Correspondingly, the state ratifies
legal private behavior after the fact by upholding it under the
law. This, of course, must be the case: public enforcement of
private rights is essential to the meaningful possession of
those rights. Under this objection, however, all private action
becomes attributable to the state because of the state's public
permission and enforcement.
Assume, for example, that A, a private citizen, excludes
B, another private citizen, from a dinner party in A's home on
account of B's ethnicity. Although A's action is a private one,
it is supported by the state's common law property rights
allowing the exclusion. Furthermore, if B sued A in a court of
law, the court would uphold A's action after the fact. The
state is therefore wound up with A's discrimination, and the
privately asserted right to exclude constitutes state action.
The same would be the case for almost any legal private
deprivation.22
20. As Professor Jerre Williams explains,
[Als a means of determining whether individual constitutional liberties
have been violated, the concept of state action has substantially lost its
utility. A court decision resolving a private legal dispute is state
action. Police action in the enforcement of a private interest is state
action. State action is broadly found in many businesses or
organizations which are substantially private in nature but have some
public concern connected with them. Indeed, all rights of private
property and of contract are based upon state law. So the enforcement
of these laws is state action.
The result is that it is difficult to conceive of situations where state
action is not present. One private citizen steals money from another.
It would be state action to refuse to enforce the law concerning theft. A
private citizen bars someone from his home on a racial basis. This is
the extreme situation which always is posed. He is entitled to claim it
as his home only because of state common law or statutory enactment,
which is state action. If he calls upon the police to evict the undesired
person from his property, this is state action. While in the past it has
been possible to use the finding of state action as the determining
factor in deciding whether constitutional rights have been violated, we
are now substantially at the end of this road.
Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347, 367 (1963).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A
New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial
890 [Vol:51
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The objection gains force because, under some
interpretations, the Supreme Court has suggested that all
state enforcement of private rights constitutes state action.2 3
In the seminal case of Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court held that
judicial enforcement of a private racially-based restrictive
covenant constituted state action. 24 Despite the fact that the
covenant was a private agreement, the Court struck it down
under the Equal Protection Clause because it had been
judicially enforced.2 5
In an oft-quoted passage, Professor Wechsler conjectures
that, under Shelley, all state enforcement of private rights
could be categorized as "state action."
[Tihe state may properly be charged with discrimination
when it does no more than give effect to an agreement
that the individual involved is, by hypothesis, entirely free
to make. Again, one is obliged to ask: What is the
principle involved? Is the state forbidden to effectuate a
will that draws a racial line, a will that can accomplish
any disposition only through the aid of law, or is it a
sufficient answer there that the discrimination was the
testator's and not the state's? May not the state employ
its law to vindicate the privacy of property against a
trespasser, regardless of the grounds of his exclusion, or
does it embrace the owner's reasons for excluding if it
buttresses his power by the law? Would a declaratory
judgment that a fee is determinable if a racially restrictive
limitation should be violated represent discrimination by
the state upon the racial ground? Would a judgment of
ejectment?26
Since Shelley, the Court has handed down a number of
seemingly inconsistent decisions finding no state action
despite the judicial enforcement of a private right after the
fact. The Court has never overruled Shelley, however; and
the logical force of the objection therefore persists. As one
commentator noted,
[1]ogically extended, the Shelley-Barrows rule simply will
not go down.. .. [Ihf the courts in adjudicating rights and
Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1008 (1961); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1959).
23. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. at 20.
26. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 29-30.
2011]1 891
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
relationships between private persons must hold every
private person to the identical constitutional standards
binding on a state, then effectively over eighty-five years
of unbroken constitutional rulings go by the board, and
individual action for all practical purposes becomes
subject to the fourteenth amendment.2
The argument that, under Shelley, private action cannot
be separated from state action is probably the most common,
and the most persuasive, argument against conceptualizing
state action; the criticism is studied by countless students in
their first-year course on constitutional law.28 It is not,
however, the only such objection.
Several commentators have posited that developing a
comprehensive conceptual structure to the state-action
inquiry is impossible because the state action inquiry can
arise in limitless factual scenarios. It can arise when any
state official-judicial, legislative, or executive-or any
individual acting jointly with a state official, or any
individual assuming the functions of a state official, deprives
someone of any civil right or liberty protected by the
Constitution.2 9 The sheer variety of circumstances where this
may occur, these commentators argue, defies reduction to a
single conceptual structure.ao
However, many doctrines of law exist in workable
fashion, even though they could apply to limitless factual
scenarios. Consider, for example, the law of negligence.
There is no end to the ways that an individual might breach
the duty to act as an ordinarily, reasonably prudent person.
This variety of factual scenarios merely required courts to
frame the law of negligence in a sufficiently flexible manner.
One could argue, in fact, that where legal structures apply to
27. St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 1008.
28. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 6.4 (Aspen Law & Business 2d ed. 2002).
29. Topol, supra note 6, at 1146.
30. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) ("This court has never
attempted the 'impossible task' of formulating an infallible test for determining
whether the State 'in any of its manifestations' has become significantly
involved in private discriminations."); Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great
Expectations, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 101, 120 ("Mhe Court will take a
particularistic approach to the state action problem, an approach difficult if not
impossible to capture in a meaningful rule or principle. Most commentators
urge such an approach because of the sheer volume and variety of no-so-
hypothetical situations that invite judicial solution.").
[Vol:51892
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a wide variety of factual circumstances, it becomes even more
important to develop a workable comprehensive conceptual
structure because, in these circumstances, it is all the more
difficult to decide cases by analogizing to precedent.
A final objection to developing a comprehensive structure
to state action is that such an approach would guide
individuals on how to evade constitutional scrutiny when
engaging in unconscionable behavior. As Professor Charles
Black explains,
The commitment of the Court to a single and exclusive
theory of state action, or to just five such theories, with
nicely marked limits for each, would be altogether
unprincipled, in terms of the most vital principle of all-
the reality principle. It would fail to correspond to the
endless variations not only of reality as presently given,
but of reality as it may be manipulated and formed in the
hands of people ruled by what seems to be one of the most
tenacious motives in American life. Such an arbitrary
commitment would serve only to instruct racism in the
essentials of evasory tactics; it would make the law,
classically, "[tiheir perch and not their terror."3'
It is true that litigants could invoke a clear state action
requirement as a shield behind which to hide unconscionable
behavior from the Constitution. This, however, is not
necessarily a bad thing; indeed, the very nature of the law is
that it sets clear limits on acceptable behavior, both for those
who wish to comply with it and for those who seek to evade
it. 3 2 When the law is clear, and wrongdoers still succeed in
escaping its grasp, policy-makers can expand the law to
ensure it prevents wrongdoing--or, at least, their failure to do
so will be blatant." Rather than striving to make any law,
including the state action doctrine, unclear, policy-makers
should seek to limit loopholes available to wrongdoers. If the
state action doctrine is sufficiently comprehensive, courts
31. Black, supra note 5, at 90-91.
32. Analogously, American constitutional law places great value on
informing citizens of what punitive rules apply and when. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed."); BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 574 (1996) ("Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the conduct that
will subject him to punishment . . . .").
33. See Wechsler, supra note 22, at 31 ("I do not hesitate to say that I prefer
to see the issues faced through legislation, where there is room for drawing lines
that courts are not equipped to draw.").
8932011]
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need not be concerned that by identifying constitutional
behavior they invite violators to conform their actions to the
test while violating the principle.
Relatedly, commentators argue that developing bright-
line rules for state action would introduce too much
inflexibility into courts' analyses, causing them to
underprotect the civil rights and liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution.35  This objection, however, ultimately only
applies to an inflexible approach containing unregulated
areas that allow actors to infringe civil rights and liberties. A
comprehensive structure to state action should be mindful of
the objection and should provide explanatory room for the
doctrine to grow to solve such problems. Thus, a useful
conceptual structure to state action could frame the analysis,
and, rather than eliminating the flexibility to deal with the
facts specific to each case, could serve as a method for
choosing the legal rules to judge the specific facts.
B. Comprehensive Structures for State Action Analysis
In light of these objections, and in light of the apparent
contradictions in state-action case law, it certainly is true
that "[M]aking sense of the state action doctrine is not an
easy task."3 6 The task, however, is not necessarily impossible
or inadvisable. A few commentators have attempted to
34. See Lewis, supra note 30, at 119 ("A mechanical or conceptual approach
to state action touches either too much or too little."); cf St. Antoine, supra note
22, at 1010 ("The development of constitutional theory must not be frozen in the
established molds of property and contract law. Concepts must not be exalted
at the expense of hard facts.").
35. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could lie
only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance was
reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right were to
be enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships which the
Amendment was designed to embrace.
Id. at 722. Professor Ronald Krotoszynski tackles inflexibility within the state-
action inquiry, arguing that distinctions within the inquiry should not be
applied rigidly. In particular, he compares the current state action structure to
'a fishing net with very wide holes." See Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at 328. He
presents meta-analysis as a way to fill these holes and inject flexibility into the
inquiry; he would allow a court to find state action based on partial satisfaction
of each of the tests, even though none of the tests are fully satisfied. Id. at 337.
This and other aspects of the theory, however, are susceptible to critique and,
ultimately, the theory is unable to make sense of state action.
36. E.g., Topol, supra note 6, at 1142.
894 [Vol:51
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develop a comprehensive conceptual structure to the state-
action inquiry that incorporates the Court's many lines of
state-action precedent." Professors William Van Alstyne and
Kenneth Karst suggest that the Court resolves every state-
action case by weighing three competing values: the "personal
interests of the parties affected by the incident which gave
rise to the case," the effect that a finding for or against state
action would have on those interests, and the effect that a
finding for or against state action would have on encouraging
local governmental responsibility.38 Preferring "the risks of
candor to those of deception," Van Alstyne and Karst propose
that the Court frame this analysis explicitly in each case."
To be sure, such analysis would be flexible enough to
successfully confront the three principal objections to current
state action jurisprudence. First, the rule allows, for
example, Shelley to be justified as a "race-case" where state
action was present only because, normatively, the right of
white residents to exclude non-whites from their
neighborhood carried less force than the right of a homeowner
to sell to a non-white person.4 0 Second, the rule could apply
37. This statement excepts abundant commentary claiming that "state
action" always exists. See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in
Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 99 (2004)
The "state action/no state action" distinction does not divide the
universe of cases into two groups depending on whether the State is
implicated in the events giving rise to the litigation. In the modern
world, the State is present in virtually every interaction between
persons, if only by choosing whether or not to enforce private
agreements.
Id. at 108; Williams, supra note 20, at 367. But see Pollak, supra note 12, at 12
("Professor Wechsler is asking whether every instance of judicial cognition of
private discrimination is state action prohibited by the fourteenth (or fifth)
amendment. The answer is 'No.'"); St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 1008 ("Does
this mean that the Shelley doctrine will be applied to the point of forbidding all
private discrimination based on a classification the state itself could not
properly make, so long as there is state enforcement in the picture? Quite
clearly not.").
38. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3, 7-8 (1961); Kane, supra note 11, at 558 ("It is impossible to
predict which standard will be used by a court examining the state actor
doctrine.").
39. Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 38, at 58.
40. Many commentators have argued that courts decide (and should decide)
questions of state action differently in the context of racial discrimination. See,
e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1291-92 (1982) ("[Mlore state involvement will be
2011]1 895
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in any number of distinct factual circumstances. Finally, the
rule is vague enough that it does not instruct would be
wrongdoers on how to toe the state action line.
Such analysis, however, would provide lower courts with
little guidance. The rule is a balancing test: if the defendant
is more worthy, against the backdrop of federalism, the court
should find that state action exists. If the plaintiff is more
worthy, against the same backdrop, the court should find that
state action does not exist. Not only would such a rule be
difficult to apply and almost certainly variable in application,
it would also require the Court to backtrack on its long-
articulated view that state action is a preliminary inquiry,
independent of the merits of the claim.
Professor Tom Rowe has proposed another
comprehensive theory of state action. He classifies state
action cases as presenting an "ordinary" state-action problem
when a public official has acted, a "nonordinary" state-action
problem when the state is in some way involved with the
conduct at issue but did not directly engage in the conduct, or
possibly a "borderline" problem that lies at the border
between the other two categories. 4 ' State action exists in all
ordinary state-action cases, but the inquiry is more complex
in nonordinary cases.4 2 In nonordinary cases, a presumption
arises against state action. 43  Litigants may rebut the
presumption in many ways, such as by proving that the
putatively private actor was carrying out a function
traditionally and exclusively performed by the state, or that
the state was so entangled with the putatively private
behavior that finding against state action would be unfair."
Each line of state-action precedent appears as a distinct way
for a litigant to rebut the presumption of no state action.4 5
Borderline cases, Professor Rowe argues, look like
nonordinary cases in that "the state is not clearly the initiator
of the action," but they differ in that the Court treats the
required to produce a holding of unconstitutionality when the constitutional
claim is lack of procedural due process, or even infringement of asserted first
amendment rights, than when the claim is of racial discrimination. . . . This
differentiation seems to me to be entirely justified.").
41. Rowe, supra note 6, at 747.
42. Id. at 747, 752.
43. Id. at 747-48.
44. Id. at 756-57.
45. Id. at 759-67.
896 [Vol:51
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cases the same way it would treat ordinary state-action
cases.4 6 The devil is in the line-drawing.47 Once the Court
begins to treat some cases lacking obvious state action as
ordinary state-action cases, "there may be no ready stopping
point short of treating all state policies as state action subject
to constitutional review on the merits."48 Professor Rowe gets
close, but he does not produce a workable rule to distinguish
ordinary cases, borderline cases, and nonordinary cases.4 9
Professor Sidney Buchanan describes the state-action
inquiry as being composed of six issues arranged into two
competing models of state action.o Under the first model of
state action, the "characterization model," a court asks
whether "the conduct of [a] private actor can be fairly
regarded as the act of the state."," The court answers this
question through the nexus test or the public-function test.52
Under the second model, the "state authorization" model,
courts focus not on whether the actor can fairly be considered
a substitute for the state, but rather whether the state has
authorized a private actor's conduct "by placing the private
actor in a position where the actor may 'gouge' the challenger
with legal impunity."" The state-authorization issue and the
state-inaction issue fall into this category.54 Professor
Buchanan argues that the state-authorization model has
fallen into decline since Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks55 but
urges courts to adopt this model. 6
46. Id. at 752.
47. See Rowe, supra note 6, at 748, 753 ("It is problematically unclear just
what falls within and without this borderline subset of the ordinary category.").
48. Id. at 767.
49. See id. ("To be workable, such an approach requires that some definable,
justifiable line separate the two categories. However helpful the structure may
be for organizing and understanding the Court's state action decisions, this
essential line may be one that cannot be intelligibly drawn and defended.").
50. Buchanan (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 344.
51. Id. at 356.
52. Id. at 357-58. Professor Buchanan also describes a "beyond state
authority" issue and a "projection of state" issue, both of which he groups as
sub-issues to the nexus test. Id. at 358.
53. Id. at 360.
54. Id. at 363.
55. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
56. Buchanan (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 362; see Buchanan (pt. 2), supra note
7, at 765 ("The Supreme Court should openly acknowledge that the Constitution
does place limits on the extent to which government may authorize one private
actor to gouge another private actor with legal impunity.").
2011] 897
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Professor Buchanan's state authorization model falls
prey to the most ubiquitous objection to the state action
doctrine: because the state has, by action or omission,
authorized all legal private conduct, this rule would make all
legal private conduct subject to the Constitution, essentially
eliminating the state action requirement.
Although these scholars have each created a foundational
conceptual structure for state action analysis, none
adequately addresses the above objections while providing a
workable, flexible, and firm conceptual framework consistent
with the bulk of Supreme Court precedent. The next Part of
this article attempts such a conceptual theory.
II. A CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE FOR STATE ACTION
Although state action case law seems scattered, it is
largely reconcilable into a usable, comprehensive structure
that successfully overcomes the traditional objections to the
conceptualization of the state action doctrine. This Part
outlines that structure by setting forth a three-step approach
to determining whether state action exists. The first step is
definitional: courts should look to the complaint to identify
what action is alleged to violate the Constitution and what
actor is alleged to have taken that action. Second, courts
should analyze whether the actor, independent of the action,
is public or private in nature. Third, in the event the actor is
private, courts should determine whether the state was
sufficiently involved with the particular action at issue to
make that action fairly attributable to the state. After
outlining each of the three steps of this analytical structure,
this Part will apply the structure to a 1984 Court of Appeals
case.
A. Defining the Action at Issue
The state action inquiry begins by identifying what
conduct and whose conduct is alleged to have violated the
Constitution. This information should be apparent from the
face of the pleadings. For example, in Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, a family was evicted from their apartment, and a city
57. No conduct can be wholly separate from state involvement. See
generally Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 886.
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marshal placed their belongings into storage with a
warehousing company. 8 The family did not pay the
warehouseman for moving or storing their belongings, and
the warehousemen threatened to sell the belongings if the
family did not pay." The family filed a class action to enjoin
the sale, claiming the sale would deprive them of their
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.60  The Court
began its state-action analysis by looking to the pleadings,
which alleged that "'the threatened sale of the goods
pursuant to New York Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210' is
an action under color of state law." 61 This statement framed
the Court's analysis. The relevant actor to the state-action
inquiry was the warehouseman, and the relevant conduct was
selling the complainants' belongings.62 The Court did not
focus its analysis on the actions of the city marshal who
helped moved the family's belongings because the
complainants did not argue that the city marshal had been
involved in any wrongdoing.6
Generally, the determination of whose conduct and what
conduct is at issue is straightforward. But this question's
simplicity should not veil its importance. Identifying whose
conduct and what conduct is at issue frames the rest of the
state-action inquiry and often determines its outcome.64
58. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 153.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 156.
62. See id. at 157 ("[The only issue presented by this case is whether Flagg
Brothers' action may fairly be attributed to the State of New York.").
63. See id. ("It must be noted that respondents have named no public
officials as defendants in this action. The city marshal, who supervised their
evictions, was dismissed from the case by the consent of all the parties."); see
also Memorandum from Charlotte Crane, Law Clerk, to Harry A. Blackmun,
Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Regarding Fourth Draft
Circulated 4/10/78, in the Flagg Bros. v. Brooks Case File (undated) (on file with
the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 271)
[T]he original complaint could support the idea that Flagg Brothers
acted as the agent of the [city] marshal when it stored respondents'
goods .... But the parties and the Court seem determined to decide the
case as if § 7-210 clearly applied and the marshal and the eviction had
nothing to do with the case, and I think I would be a little
uncomfortable reworking the case to such an extent when the
respondents have for some reason chosen to ignore it.
Id. at 1.
64. In Shelley, for example, if the court had looked to the private neighbor's
behavior rather than the court's behavior, state action probably would not have
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As previously discussed, for example, scholars have long
struggled with how to reconcile Shelley with the bulk of
Supreme Court case law. The case is far easier to explain
once we determine whose conduct, and what conduct, was at
issue. Thirty families in a St. Louis neighborhood entered
into a racially restrictive covenant contracting with one
another that they would not sell their property to "people of
the Negro or Mongolian race."65 In violation of the terms of
the restrictive covenant, one of the parties contracted to sell
his property to the Shelleys, a black family. 6 Other parties
to the restrictive covenant brought suit in St. Louis Circuit
Court, asking for an injunction prohibiting the sale .6  The
trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri,
sitting en banc, reversed and granted the injunction. 8
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court did not analyze
whether the neighbors, as parties to the restrictive covenant,
violated the Constitution by agreeing to exclude parties on
the basis of race. Rather, it analyzed whether the Supreme
Court of Missouri violated the Constitution by granting the
injunction enforcing the racially restrictive covenant.6" The
Court spent little time on the state action question; a state
court is undeniably a state actor. Instead, it spent the bulk of
its analysis determining whether the substantive law of the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited a court from upholding
such an agreement.7
The Shelley Court, in short, was very clear that it was
analyzing the Supreme Court of Missouri's actions rather
than the actions of private parties. In fact, it explicitly
distinguished an earlier case, Corrigan v. Buckley,7n because
in that case the parties had challenged the private behavior of
existed.
65. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5 (1948).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 4, 7.
70. Under the current law of the Equal Protection Clause, such a holding
certainly would not violate the Constitution, as one could not say that the
Missouri Supreme Court intended to discriminate on the basis of race.
Substantive equal protection law, however, may have been different when
Shelley was handed down. Because this article does not address substantive
equal protection jurisprudence, it makes no claim about whether Shelley is
consistent in this regard.
71. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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entering into the restrictive covenants rather than the public
enforcement of those agreements.7 2 The Shelley Court noted
that, in Corrigan,
[Tihe question of the validity of court enforcement of the
restrictive covenants under the Fifth Amendment [was
not] properly before the Court. . . . [In Corrigan,] [tihe
only constitutional issue which the appellants had raised
in the lower courts, and hence the only constitutional
issue before this Court on appeal, was the validity of the
covenant agreements as such.
The Shelley Court went on to distinguish the facts before
it. In Shelley, the briefs had "rais[ed] the question of the
validity, not of the private agreements as such, but of the
judicial enforcement of those agreements."" A close reading
of Shelley thus demonstrates that, despite the volumes
written about Shelley and the state action doctrine, the state
action issue addressed by the Court in Shelley was cursory;
the main issue was one of substantive equal protection law.
B. Pinning Down the Public-Private Divide
The second step of the state-action inquiry analyzes the
actor identified in the first step to determine whether that
actor's nature is public or private. If the actor is public, its
conduct is state action subject to the Constitution, and the
state action inquiry ends. If the actor is private, on the
other hand, its conduct is subject to the Constitution only if
the state became sufficiently involved with the private actor's
behavior-a question the court must answer through a third
stage of analysis.
Courts ask two questions in order to determine whether
the actor defined in the first step of analysis is public or
private in nature: (1) whether the actor is governmental or
nongovernmental, and (2) whether it acted in a public or
private capacity during the allegedly unconstitutional
72. Id.
73. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1948).
74. Id. at 9.
75. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995)
(holding that because Amtrak is part and parcel of the state, all of its actions
are subject to the Constitution).
76. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (holding that despite
generalized funding, there was no state action because the state did not
encourage the particular violation).
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conduct. If the answer to either of these questions is yes, the
actor is public in nature, and state action exists. If the
answer to both is no, the actor is private in nature; and the
court must move to the question of whether the state was
sufficiently involved with the private actor's behavior.
1. What is a Governmental Entity?
Governmental entities include the bodies that make up
local, state, and federal governments, such as legislatures,
courts, and executive agencies, 7 as well as their on-duty
employees, such as judges, congressmen, and police officers."
Often, the governmental entity is easy to identify. In Shelley,
for example, the Supreme Court had no trouble determining
that the relevant governmental entity was the Supreme
Court of Missouri. 9
Entities that are controlled by governmental entities also
77. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (assessing the
constitutionality of legislative action). Governmental entities at any level
within the government suffice as state actors. See, e.g., Abernathy, supra note
12, at 378 ("The Court has found violations of the [Fourteenth] amendment by
the state courts, legislatures, executives, tax boards, boards of education,
counties, and cities, among others.") (footnotes omitted).
78. Abernathy, supra note 12, at 378;
The letter of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is that no state shall deprive
or deny. Its real meaning is that no one who represents the state,
acting for it and in its name, shall deprive or deny. ... [Ilt cannot mean
anything else [because], literally speaking, a state cannot act at all.
Those representing it as officers or agents alone can act.
Barnett, supra note 12, at 231 n.18 The caveat to this rule is that government
"[o]fflicers have a dual personality. It is only when they act under state
authority or 'color of state authority,' under 'color or pretense' of law, that their
acts are the acts of the 'state' under the amendments." Barnett, supra note 12,
at 243. A real question exists as to when off-duty government officials act
"under color of law," and the answer depends on the circumstances giving rise to
the constitutional challenge.
Such circumstances may be considered as whether the officer (if a
peace officer) was wearing a uniform or badge, whether he was known
to the injured party as an official of the state, whether he acted 'under
pretense' of his official position, whether he would have acted in the
same manner if he had not held a state office, and any other
circumstances relevant to determining the fact question.
See Abernathy, supra note 12, at 384-85 It is often the subject of litigation.
See, e.g., Van Ort v. Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831 (1996).
79. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) ("That the action of state
courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as
action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.").
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are a part of the government for state-action purposes.so In
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., for example,
Amtrak denied an advertiser billboard space because of the
advertiser's political message." The Court held that because
the federal government created and subsidized Amtrak in
furtherance of governmental objectives, appointed the
majority of Amtrak's board members, and held a majority of
Amtrak stock, the government controlled Amtrak,82 and
Amtrak was therefore no different than any other federal
agency.8 3 The Court explicitly distinguished its opinion from
one holding that Amtrak was a private actor but subject to
constitutional scrutiny because of its connection to the state.8 4
Similarly, in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association," the Court was faced with the
question of whether the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association (TSSAA) was a state actor. 6 TSSAA was a
private association with members representing secondary
schools throughout Tennessee.87  Although the TSSAA was
technically private, eighty-four percent of its members were
state employees acting in their official capacity, representing
public schools. The Court held that, like Amtrak, TSSAA
was an extension of the state, as it was controlled by state
80. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400 ("We hold that where, as here, the Government
creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental
objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of
the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the
Government.. .."). Failure to recognize this type of control might allow
governments to circumvent the Constitution by allowing private companies to
do its bidding. Id. at 397.
That Government-created and -controlled corporations are (for many
purposes at least) part of the Government itself has a strong basis, not
merely in past practice and understanding, but in reason itself. It
surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the
most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply
resorting to the corporate form.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 378-79, 400.
84. Id. at 378-79 (distinguishing the arguments); id. at 400 ("We hold
that .. . the corporation is part of the Government.") (emphasis added).
85. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001).
86. Id. at 290-91.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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officials acting in their official capacity.89 It was not enough
that some TSSAA members were Tennessee officials; but
when Tennessee officials became so numerous that they
effectively controlled TSSAA, the association became
governmental in character.90
Post-Brentwood, an important, open question in the law
is how much state ownership and control must exist before an
organization becomes a governmental entity.9' Total
ownership and control suffices, as in Lebron.9" Eighty-four
percent membership plus control of the board of directors
suffices, as in Brentwood." The lower limit of ownership and
control necessary to turn an organization into an arm of the
government, however, remains unclear.
2. What is Acting in a Public Capacity?
The other question relevant to determining the public or
private nature of an actor is whether the actor is acting in a
public or private capacity in the course of the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct. Commentators have put forth a
number of theories about when a nongovernmental entity is
acting in a public capacity. One theory posits that
nongovernmental entities act in a public capacity when they
affect a large number of people.9 4 Although this theory is
persuasive from a policy perspective, it rests on a distinction
between the powerful and the weak that has for the most part
89. See id.
90. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, for example, a
minority of NCAA members were public officials from the State of Nevada. 488
U.S. 179, 193-94 (1988). These Nevada officials in no way controlled the NCAA,
however; they did not even make up a majority. Id. The NCAA was not deemed
to be a public actor. Id. at 199.
91. Some scholars have interpreted Brentwood as changing prior case law
by creating a new "entwinement" test. See, e.g., Michael A. Culpepper, Case
Note, A Matter of Normative Judgment: Brentwood and the Emergence of the
"Pervasive Entwinement" Test, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1163, 1164, 1188 (2001).
Whether Brentwood actually creates a new doctrine of law, or belongs to the
Court's line of cases dealing with governmental ownership or control, is beyond
the scope of this Article.
92. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
93. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
291 (2001).
94. See Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 217-18 (1957); Kenneth L.
Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39-80 (1967).
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been rejected by courts in the state action context.9 5  The
Court has instead defined public capacity through the public
function doctrine, by identifying actions "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state."96
The classic example of a function traditionally and
exclusively reserved for the state is the function of owning
and controlling a town. In Marsh v. Alabama, the Gulf
Shipbuilding Company owned the town of Chickasaw,
Alabama. 97 Chickasaw was a town in the traditional sense of
the word; it contained "residential buildings, streets, a system
of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on
which business places [were] situated."98  The Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation provided all traditional municipal
services, including the enforcement of city ordinances."
Within Chickasaw, the Corporation had promulgated an anti-
solicitation policy and had posted signs to that effect.' 00 In
keeping with that policy, the town sheriff asked a Jehovah's
Witness to stop distributing religious literature on the
Chickasaw sidewalk.' 0 The Jehovah's Witness refused to do
so, and she was arrested by the town sheriff and ultimately
convicted of trespass.' 0 2 She contested her conviction,
arguing that it violated her First Amendment rights to
speak."o0 The Corporation responded that because it was a
private actor, it was not subject to the Constitution.' 04 The
Supreme Court disagreed and held that the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation was a state actor, subject to the Constitution,
95. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (refusing to take
the size or power of the defendant into account and holding that a monopoly
utility company was not a state actor). But see Adolph A. Berle, Constitutional
Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion
Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942 (1952) (arguing
descriptively that before Jackson corporations with market power were
becoming subject to the Constitution by stating that "[tihe emerging principle
appears to be that the corporation, itself a creation of the state, is as subject to
constitutional limitations which limit action as is the state itself').
96. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351-52.
97. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 503.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 503-04.
103. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1946).
104. Id. at 505.
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because by running a town it was undertaking a role
traditionally exclusively reserved for the state. 0
Similarly, in Terry v. Adams, the Court held that holding
an election to select a candidate for public office is a public
function."1' The Jaybirds, a private political organization,
was established in Fort Bend County, Texas in 1889 for the
sole purpose of disenfranchising the black citizens of the
County.'o Before each Democratic Primary, the Jaybirds
held an election where blacks could not vote.' 08 Although the
winner of the Jaybird Primary was not legally entitled to
become the Democratic nominee, white citizens in the area
rallied around the Jaybird winner, who nearly always won
the Democratic Primary and the general election.109
Although blacks could technically vote in the democratic
primary and the general election, these votes had no
influence on the outcome;1 0 in practice, the winner was
decided in the Jaybird Primary."' Black citizens who had
been denied the right to vote in the Jaybird Primary filed
suit, arguing that the Jaybirds violated the Constitution by
excluding blacks from voting rolls." 2 The Jaybirds responded
that because they were a private group, the Constitution did
not apply." 3 The Court held that although the Jaybirds were
private actors, they were exercising a public function that had
historically been reserved for the state. " The club was
therefore a state actor bound by the Constitution.
Despite the rulings in Terry and Marsh, the public
function doctrine is very narrow and has very rarely been
applied to find state action; there are, by definition, few cases
105. Id. at 508.
106. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 466 (1953). The Terry majority
conceptualized the Jaybirds as a nongovernmental party exercising a public
function. However, the Terry concurrence, written by Justice Jackson,
conceptualized the Jaybirds as a governmental entity, much like the
governmental entities at issue in Brentwood and Lebron. The concurrence held
that the Jaybirds were "part and parcel" of the Democratic Party, stressing how
the same people who controlled the Democratic Party controlled the Jaybirds.
Terry, 345 U.S. at 477-80.
107. Id. at 462-63.
108. Id. at 464-65.
109. Id. at 463-65.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 (1953).
113. Id. at 462-63.
114. Id. at 466-69.
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of private parties taking on roles that, traditionally, only
states have undertaken.1 15  In Flagg Brothers, for example,
the plaintiff argued that a private creditor acted in a public
capacity when it took advantage of a self-help statute,
because historically the government had handled the
resolution of disputes between its citizens.116  In defense of
the plaintiffs position, Justice Marshall wrote in a letter to
the conference:
Cases like this one require us to develop some core notion
of what governments do. We would all presumably agree
that, if a State turned over its function of issuing drivers'
licenses to a private company, the company could not
refuse to issue a license to an individual because it did not
like his race. This case involves another area of
traditional state involvement: the nonconsensual
resolution of disputes.1 17
The majority disagreed. It held that a private action is
likely to be a state function only if the action has been, more
or less, exclusively reserved for the state in the past.'1 8 The
Court cited elections as a specific example, referencing
Terry.119 Because there are very few instances of private
parties holding elections for public office, holding an election
for public office qualifies as a public function traditionally
exclusively reserved for the state.12 0 Historically, however, of
many available dispute resolution methods, only some
involved the court system.'2 1 Dispute resolution, therefore,
was not a public function traditionally and exclusively
reserved for the state.
In Flagg Brothers, the Court explicitly left open the
question of whether a different, less restrictive rule should
apply in cases where the private party forecloses the entire
function at issue, making it so that the government no longer
115. E.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (expressly overruling a
prior decision that interpreted public function more broadly).
116. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 153-57 (1978).
117. Letter to the Conference, Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks Case File (Jan. 23, 1978) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 212).
118. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-58.
119. Id. at 158.
120. Id. It is notable that there were at least some instances of private
elections, as evidenced by the fact that the Jaybirds had existed since the 1890s.
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953).
121. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161-63.
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performs the role.' 22 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
however, the Court clarified that, even where a private
company forecloses the government from performing a role,
the role is not a public function if private parties historically
performed it.'13  In Jackson, a private company with a
monopoly to provide power in a given area was not public in
nature, despite the fact that it had completely foreclosed the
role, because there was an established history of states
granting monopolies to private utility companies.1 24
The case law indicates that a private actor acts in a
public capacity where it offers a service that has traditionally
only been offered by the state, and where there is no
substantial history of private -behavior. Although this is by
no means a bright line rule, it is at least a workable standard
that the lower courts could implement.
3. Four Types ofActors
By asking the two questions discussed above-whether
the actor is governmental or nongovernmental and whether
the actor is acting in a public or private capacity-we can
identify four categories of actors: (1) governmental entities
acting in a public capacity; (2) governmental entities acting in
a private capacity; (3) nongovernmental entities acting in a
public capacity; and (4) nongovernmental entities acting in a
private capacity. Although the Supreme Court has never
explicitly used this mode of analysis, the outcomes of its case
law demonstrate that actors in the first three categories are
public, meaning their actions are state actions subject to
constitutional scrutiny. 2 5  Nongovernmental entities acting
in a private capacity are private, subject to the Constitution
only when the state is sufficiently supportive of the
challenged conduct. Subpart C of this Part of the article
discusses precisely when the state becomes sufficiently
supportive to make private conduct fairly attributable to the
state.
Governmental actors acting in a public capacity are the
prototypical state actors. Examples include a state court
122. Id. at 158-59.
123. 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995);
Terry, 345 U.S. at 462-65.
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handing down a judgment, a police officer making an arrest,
and a fire department responding to an emergency. These
actors' conduct is state action subject to the Constitution. In
Shelley v. Kramer, for example, the Supreme Court held that
a state court entering a judgment was a state actor:
We have no doubt that there has been state action . . . in
the full and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed
facts disclose that petitioners were willing purchasers of
properties upon which they desired to establish homes.
The owners of the properties were willing sellers; and
contracts of sale were accordingly consummated. It is
clear that but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties
in question without restraint. 126
Governmental actors acting in a private capacity are also
public actors subject to the Constitution. In Lebron, for
example, the governmental entity Amtrak was treated as a
public actor even though it was operating in the private
capacity of running a transportation business. 127  State
officials, furthermore, are considered public even if they
exceed their authority and violate state policy or law.' In
Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 29 for
example, a telephone company attempted to enjoin a city
ordinance as a violation of the federal Constitution. 130
126. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). The Court ultimately ruled
this action unconstitutional. Id. at 20, 23. As a result of how the Court framed
its state-action inquiry and subsequent constitutional analysis, the racially
restrictive covenant was unenforceable but not void.
127. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
128. The breadth and applicability of 42 U.S.C § 1983 (West 2006), providing
a private right of action against persons who violate the constitution under color
of state law, is beyond the scope of this Article. Because § 1983 only provides a
remedy where there is a constitutional violation, any case holding a police
officer who exceeds his authority liable under § 1983 also implicitly holds that
that police officer is a state actor capable of violating the Constitution. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). In Monroe, police officers ransacked
a suspect's apartment in violation of official policy and the law. Id. at 169-72.
Even though they acted in contravention of law, the Court held that the officers
could be held liable under § 1983, implicitly holding that they were state actors
capable of violating the Constitution. Id. at 187. Twenty-one years after
Monroe, in Lugar, the Court held that the § 1983 "under color of" law
requirement and the constitutional state action requirement are identical.
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 927 (1982).
129. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
130. Id. at 281.
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Officials answered that the ordinance did not constitute state
action because it violated a state-level law.131 The Court
disagreed, holding that "the [Fourteenth] Amendment
contemplates the possibility of state officers abusing the
powers lawfully conferred upon them."'32
State action also exists in the rare case where a
nongovernmental actor acts in a public capacity.' The Court
finds this situation only where, as in Terry and Marsh, a
private party takes on a role traditionally and exclusively
reserved for the state.' If there is any substantial history of
private parties undertaking the function at issue, the court
will not find action in a public capacity.
State action does not necessarily exist, however, when a
nongovernmental actor acts in a private capacity. For the
action to be subject to constitutional scrutiny, the government
must have encouraged or ratified it sufficiently to make the
action fairly attributable to the state. "35
C. Determining Whether Private Conduct Can Fairly Be
Attributed to the State
In the fourth category of actors discussed above, where a
nongovernmental actor is acting in a private capacity, the
question whether the deprivation is state action proceeds to a
third step of analysis: whether the state's interaction with the
131. Id. at 287.
132. Id. at 288.
133. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
134. Often, Terry and Marsh are classified with cases where the state
delegates a role for the purpose of getting around the Constitution, but in both,
the presence of state action was based solely on the behavior of the private
party. The question is only what the private party is doing, not how the private
party came to be doing it. A nongovernmental entity may act in a public
capacity irrespective of whether the entity gained power through governmental
delegation or through its own fortitude. Delegation cases, on the other hand,
are based on the cooperation between the state and a private actor, two
analytically distinct parties. This article, therefore, distinguishes delegation
cases, grouping them below in Part III and examining when state cooperation
makes private action fairly attributable to the state.
135. Given that the state may encourage or ratify, or discourage or condemn,
a private actor's conduct, no conduct can be wholly separate from state
involvement. See generally Sunstein, supra note 14, at 886. Nevertheless,
courts view the actor and the state as analytically distinct when a
nongovernmental actor has acted in a private capacity; state action will only
exist if the state sufficiently encouraged or ratified the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct.
910 [Vol:51
MAKING SENSE OF STATE ACTION
nongovernmental actor is sufficient for the deprivation to be
fairly attributable to the state.
State interaction with the nongovernmental actor can
occur before, during, or after the private deprivation. If the
state interaction occurs before the deprivation-for example,
if the state funds or regulates the actor-the deprivation is
fairly attributable to the state if the state encourages or
compels the interaction. But the deprivation is not
attributable if the state merely permits it. If the state
cooperates during or after the deprivation-for example,
through police or judicial enforcement-the deprivation is
fairly attributable to the state if the state gives special
assistance, over and above ordinary law enforcement, to
further it.
1. When is Prior State Involvement Enough to Make a
Private Action Fairly Attributable to the State?
The state does something to influence every private
action before it occurs.' 3 For example, the state might take
an express position that an action is good or bad, requiring,
prohibiting, or authorizing it. Any branch of the
government-legislative, judicial, or executive-could express
such a position. Alternatively, the state might take an
implied position on an action. It might, for example,
promulgate a policy that would reasonably be thought to
encourage the action. On top of this, the state might take a
more proximate position. It might, for example, facilitate a
private action through funding or regulation. Even if the
state does not take any active express or implied position on
an action, the state passively permits the action; this passive
permission is, of course, a position in itself.
The state's influence on any private action can be
classified by placing the relationship between the state and
the private action on a spectrum. On this spectrum, the state
might mandate a private action, encourage it, permit it,
136. This point is the basis for many protean objections to the state action
doctrine. Many have argued that since government has always taken a position
on our behavior, there is always state action. However, we do not find this
objection fatal to the doctrine. Although it is true that some obvious state
action always exists, it is not true that that obvious state action influences the
private action in such a way that it becomes attributable to the state. See infra
Part III.
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discourage it, or prohibit it. This is true of any private action,
but this spectrum is most relevant to the state action inquiry
in situations where the private action, were it undertaken by
the state, would be an unconstitutional deprivation. This
article refers to this category of private actions as "private
deprivations." To give a few examples, a state would
mandate a private deprivation if it passed a law requiring all
private clubs to exclude blacks from membership. A state
would prohibit a private deprivation if it required utility
companies to provide due process before cutting off a
customer's service.
The spectrum of relationships between the state and a
private deprivation spans from prohibition to discouragement
to permission to encouragement to mandate. At one end of
the spectrum are state prohibitions of private deprivations.
Prohibit means "to officially forbid something" or "to prevent
a particular activity by making it impossible."13' Next on this
spectrum are state actions that discourage private
deprivations. Discourage means "to prevent or try to prevent
something happening or someone doing something, by
making things difficult or unpleasant, or by showing
disapproval." 3 8 A state, by discouraging a deprivation, aims
at preventing its occurrence. In the center of the spectrum
are state actions that permit or authorize private
deprivations. Permit is defined as "to allow something,"139
and authorize means only to officially permit something. 14 0
When a state permits or authorizes an action, it does not take
a normative stance on the issue but merely allows the action
to occur. Because the state's action neither promotes nor
undermines the private action, permission has little influence
over the actions that private parties will take. Further along
137. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
httpd/dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=63293&dict=CALD (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011).
138. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http/dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=22197&dict=CALD (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011).
139. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http/dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=58971&dict=CALD (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011).
140. See CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http/dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=4956&dict=CALD (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011) ("Authorize, verb, to give official permission for something to
happen or to give someone official permission to do something.").
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this spectrum are state actions that encourage private
deprivations. Encourage means "to make someone more
likely to do something, or to make something more likely to
happen," or "to talk or behave in a way that gives someone
confidence to do something."14 1 Finally, at the end of the
spectrum are state actions that mandate private deprivations.
To mandate an action is "to order someone to do
something."14 2
This article reconciles Supreme Court precedent by
drawing the line for finding state action between permission
and encouragement. Where the state merely authorizes or
permits a deprivation, the state action is not constitutionally
significant; however, where the state encourages a
deprivation, it becomes attributable to the state. Reitman v.
Mulkey and Rendall-Baker illustrate this distinction. In
Reitman, for example, the Court found that the state's
encouragement of private racial discrimination was sufficient
for a finding of state action.'4 3 In Rendell-Baker, however,
the Court explained that "a State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised
such coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the State."1" Therefore, distinguishing clearly
between permission and encouragement is important.
The Supreme Court has given no explicit directions, but
it has dropped hints that the distinction between permission
and encouragement should be based on the state's intent
towards the private deprivation: again and again, the Court
has refused to find state action in cases where the state's
actions "[we]re [not] intended either overtly or covertly to
encourage [a private deprivation]." In keeping with these
outcomes, this article proposes that to determine whether a
law encouraged a particular behavior, we look to whether the
141. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=25527&dict=CALD (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011).
142. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=48527&dict=CALD (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011).
143. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967).
144. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
145. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
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state took some action that it intended to make the specific
private deprivation more likely to occur.146 Because a state,
as an artificial entity, cannot be said to intend anything, such
a rule would look at the intent of the state officials
responsible for the action that arguably encouraged the
private deprivation. To determine whether a law encouraged
a private deprivation, for example, such a rule would look at
whether the legislators responsible for the law intended, by
passing the law, to make the specific private deprivation more
likely to occur.
Under this rule, intent could be proven objectively or
subjectively. Subjective intent could be shown by actions or
statements by state officials demonstrating a desire to make
the private violation more likely. 147 If such statements do not
exist, however, intent could be proven objectively, by showing
the state had such a significant interest in the deprivation's
occurrence that it permitted the deprivation for its own
benefit. 148
a. Permission and Encouragement in the Context of
the Warren Court's Race Decisions
Because encouragement is more likely when the interests
of the state and the private violator align, encouragement is
highly dependent on the historical and extra-legal context.
As the Court adeptly noted in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, "fo]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the state in private
conduct be attributed its true significance.
During the Warren Court era, for example, many state
and local governments shared with white citizens an impetus
for maintaining racial segregation. In this historical context,
146. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 (finding no state action because the
state did not in any way influence the physician's decision to downgrade
medical care).
147. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 270-73 (1963) (finding state
action where city officials issued statements condemning sit-in protests against
segregation).
148. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961)
("Neither can it be ignored, especially in view of Eagle's affirmative allegation
that for it to serve Negroes would injure its business, that profits earned by
discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable elements in,
the financial success of a governmental agency.").
149. Id. at 722.
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governments were especially likely to encourage private
parties to violate the constitutional rights of black Americans.
The Court on multiple occasions relied on this backdrop to
objectively prove that a state or local government encouraged
a private violation.
Burton and Reitman aptly illustrate the context-
dependent definition of encouragement and state intention.
The controversy in Burton began when the Wilmington
Parking Authority, a Delaware state agency, undertook to
build a large parking deck in downtown Wilmington. 0 After
it had purchased the lots and begun construction on the
facility, the Authority realized that it was not going to bring
in enough income to cover its debt."5 ' It decided, as a result,
to lease part of the projected deck as commercial space. 1 52
The highest bidder, Eagle Coffee Shop, won the lease.153
Because Eagle's financial success was important to the
Parking Authority, 14 the Parking Authority covenanted in its
lease to pay Eagle's utilities and to make all repairs.' It
also agreed to complete the decorative finishing, including
utility connections, toilets, tile, and stairs, at no cost to
Eagle.5I When it completed construction, the Parking
Authority placed signs on the building indicating its public
character and flew the American flag from the roof.'5 7
Although the Authority had the power to regulate Eagle's use
of the coffee shop, it did not require Eagle to make its services
available on a nondiscriminatory basis. 5 8  Unsurprisingly,
then, when the coffee shop opened, Eagle refused to serve
black patrons on the grounds that doing so would be bad for
business.' 59 A black person who was turned away on the
basis of his race sued the shop, and the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court.' 0
The justices split four-one-four in their decision.'6 1
150. Id. at 719.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 719 (1961).
155. Id. at 720.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 716, 724.
160. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).
161. Id. at 716.
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Justice Clark wrote the plurality opinion, holding that Eagle
was a state actor and that its behavior was subject to
constitutional scrutiny.16 2 He emphasized that the Authority
permitted and arguably encouraged Eagle's behavior by
paying many of Eagle's costs and failing to include a
nondiscrimination provision in the lease.16 3  Although,
arguably, the Authority's actions merely authorized Eagle to
act, when the historical context is taken into account, the
Authority's failure to prohibit Eagle from discriminating
constituted tacit encouragement,'" because of the highly
politicized ongoing desegregation battle1 65 and because the
Parking Authority stood to financially gain from Eagle's
discrimination.16 6  The level of encouragement in Burton
could be proven objectively by the circumstances surrounding
it.
Based on these considerations, the Court held that
[bly its inaction, the Authority ... has elected to place its
power, prestige, and service behind the admitted
discrimination. The state has so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity,
which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been
so "purely private" as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.167
Reitman v. Mulkey, even more than Burton, illustrates
how a highly publicized context can transform what is
technically mere permission into encouragement. In
Reitman, the people of California passed a proposition
amending the state constitution to allow-as a right-racially
restrictive covenants.168 The proposition came on the heels of
two highly controversial laws, the Unruh Act'6 9 and the
Hawkins Act,170 both of which prohibited some racial
162. Id. at 725.
163. Id. at 720.
164. See id. at 725 ("[The Authority . . . has elected to place its power,
prestige, and service behind the admitted discrimination.").
165. Burton was decided only three years before the hotly contested Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
166. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
167. Id. at 725.
168. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 374 (1967).
169. Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 2006).
170. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1954.50-1954.53 (West 2010).
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discrimination in housing."' The amendment's "immediate
design and intent" was to overturn these laws.'72 As in
Burton, the Court in Reitman voted four-one-four to find state
action. 1
On its face, the amendment merely permitted
homeowners to discriminate and did nothing to encourage the
discrimination.'7 4 However, a plurality of the Court held that
the amendment should be examined in terms of its
"immediate objective, its ultimate effect, and its historical
context." 7 5  Looking closer, the Court held that the
amendment encouraged-rather than merely permitted-
private race discrimination. 7  The Court stressed that
lawmakers wanted the law to foster private discrimination in
order to keep a segregated housing market. It noted, "the
state [took] affirmative action designed to make private
discriminations legally possible."1 77  As a result, "[tihose
practicing racial discriminations need no longer rely solely on
their personal choice. They could [instead] invoke express
constitutional authority . . . .""7 Thus, the ultimate impact of
the amendment was to "encourage and significantly involve
the State in private racial discrimination."179
b. Permission and Encouragement in the Context of
Funding and Regulation
Given the distinction between permission and
encouragement, it is logical that governmental funding and
regulation do not by themselves generally constitute
encouragement. If the state funds a private party without
any intention that the private party will deprive another of
constitutional rights, the state is not encouraging the specific
171. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 369.
174. See id. at 371 (quoting the text of the proposition).
175. Id. at 373. The Court went on to note that it "frequently" takes
historical context into account when evaluating the constitutionality of statutes.
Id. (citing Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Turner v. City of Memphis,
369 U.S. 350 (1962); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
176. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 377.
179. Id. at 376.
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deprivation at issue. This is true even if the money in fact
makes the deprivation possible, or at least easier. In 1982,
the Burger Court decided two cases on the same day that
both dealt with the question of when state funding and
regulation could make private action fairly attributable to the
state. 8 0  Both cases turned on the distinction between
permission and encouragement, as laid out above.
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,' 8 1 the Court considered
whether a private remedial school was a state actor. The
school, New Perspectives, had been established to
accommodate students who could not succeed in the public
school system.18 2  Local school districts referred troubled
students to New Perspectives and paid the remedial school
for that student's education.' 3 Although technically private,
New Perspectives received ninety percent of its budget from
the state and was highly regulated.'8 4 With regard to
personnel management however, there was little
regulation. 8 5  New Perspectives was only required to
"maintain written job descriptions and written statements
describing personnel standards and procedures."'"' New
Perspectives fired a teacher for disagreeing with the
principal, and the teacher sued, claiming that by firing her,
the school violated her First Amendment rights of
expression. 8 7 New Perspectives argued that it was a private
actor, so the Constitution did not apply.'
The Court held for the school, stating, "a State normally
can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has
exercised such coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to
be that of the State."189  The Court held that funding and
regulation might be relevant in some situations; however, the
Court reasoned that the funding and regulation of New
180. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982).
181. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
182. Id. at 832.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 833.
186. Id.
187. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 833-34 (1982).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 840.
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Perspectives did not encourage the specific decision to fire the
teacher.'90 "Indeed, in contrast to the extensive regulation of
the school generally, the various regulators showed relatively
little interest in the school's personnel matters."191 The Court
distinguished Burton because in that case, the state profited
from and encouraged the restaurant's specific discriminatory
conduct.192 In Rendell-Baker, by contrast, the state had no
interest in whether or not New Perspectives fired the
teacher.193 In his concurrence, Justice White also emphasized
that the state had not encouraged the specific violation: "the
critical factor is the absence of any allegation that the
employment decision itself was based upon some rule of
conduct or policy put forth by the State."'94
Another case, Blum v. Yaretsky, concerned a private
nursing home that participated in the Medicaid program. 19 5
Like the school in Rendell-Baker, the nursing home in Blum
was heavily regulated and primarily funded by the state. 9 6
Because the nursing home participated in Medicaid, eligible
citizens could go to the nursing home to receive medically
necessary care. 7 Once they were admitted, nursing home
physicians were required to periodically assess Medicaid
patients to decide whether they should be transferred to a
higher or lower care facility. 98 The plaintiffs in Blum were
transferred from the nursing home to a lower level of care."9
They sued the state officials in charge of the Medicaid
program, seeking to hold those officials liable for the actions
of the nursing home doctors.2 00 The plaintiffs argued that
they had been deprived of their property rights to Medicaid
benefits without due process of law.20'
As in Rendell-Baker, the Blum Court held that
governmental regulation is not dispositive for determining
190. Id. at 841.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 842.
193. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982).
194. Id. at 844 (White, J., concurring).
195. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 995 (1982).
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 995 (1982).
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state action.20 2 The relevant question is not whether the
private party was regulated, but whether the regulation
encouraged the alleged constitutional deprivation.
Specifically, the question was whether the state's regulations
and funding encouraged the nursing home to downgrade the
plaintiffs' care without affording due process.2 0 3  The
plaintiffs in Blum argued that the state mandated the
downgrade.2 " If the nursing home physicians found that the
plaintiffs did not need to stay in the nursing home, the state
required it to downgrade or discharge them. The Court,
however, disagreed with this characterization. It emphasized
that the decision about whether the medical care was
necessary was entirely in the physician's discretion, noting,
"[t]here is no suggestion that those decisions were
emphasized in any degree by the State's obligation to adjust
benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of medically
necessary care."2 05 According to the Court, because the state
was not involved in the physician's decision, the state did not
encourage the deprivation.
Neither Blum, nor Rendell-Baker, called into question
the rule that state encouragement of the specific deprivation
is enough to create state action. Rather, these opinions
analyzed the facts before them and held that in the specific
situations at issue, state officials did not intend to make the
specific deprivation more likely. In Rendell-Baker, the state
had no interest in whether or not New Perspectives fired the
teacher. Similarly, in Blum, the plaintiffs failed to allege that
the state encouraged nursing homes to discharge patients
without due process.206 Permission and acquiescence is not
sufficient; encouragement is.
c. Permission and Encouragement in the Context of
Monopolies
For reasons similar to those in the funding and
regulation context, a state's grant of a monopoly does not
202. See id. at 1004.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 996-97.
205. Id. at 1005.
206. As an aside, the situation would be quite different if the state were to
fund a private party in order to make it more likely that the funded party would
deprive another of constitutional rights.
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create state action per se. The Court, in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., interpreted Moose Lodge v. Irvis to
hold that a state does not, by granting a monopoly,
necessarily encourage the monopolist to violate specific
constitutional rights.2 07 In neither Jackson, nor Moose Lodge,
was there evidence to suggest that the state intended to
encourage a private deprivation.
In Moose Lodge, the plaintiff, a black man, was excluded
from a private social club because of a whites-only
membership policy. 208 He sued the club, alleging its policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 09 The club responded
that because it was a private actor, the Constitution did not
apply.210  The plaintiff argued that the club should be
considered a state actor because the state liquor and control
board had licensed and regulated it.211 The majority held
that the board did not, by regulating the club and granting it
a liquor license, encourage the club to discriminate, especially
given that the state had no interest in seeing the
discrimination take place.2 12 It noted that "the Pennsylvania
statutes and regulations governing the sale of liquor are [not]
intended either overtly or covertly to encourage
discrimination. "21 This makes sense under the permission
and encouragement distinction discussed above. There was
no evidence in Moose Lodge suggesting that the liquor and
control board did anything to make it more likely that Moose
Lodge would exclude members on the basis of race.
In Jackson, a private utility company cut off a customer's
service without due process. Because the state had granted
207. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (discussing Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
208. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1972).
209. Id. at 165.
210. See id. at 171.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 176-77.
213. Id. at 173. The Court did note one exception: "Even though the Liquor
Control Board regulation in question is neutral in its terms, the result of its
application in a case where the constitution and bylaws of a club required racial
discrimination would be to invoke the sanctions of the State to enforce a
concededly discriminatory private rule." Id. at 178-79. Accordingly, "[Aippellee
was entitled to a decree enjoining the enforcement of . . . the regulations
promulgated by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board insofar as that
regulation requires compliance by Moose Lodge with provisions of its
constitution and bylaws containing racially discriminatory provisions." Id. at
179.
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the company a monopoly and heavily regulated it, the
plaintiff argued the company was a state actor. The Court
relied on Moose Lodge to hold that despite granting monopoly
status, the state did not sufficiently cooperate with the utility
to make the utility a state actor.2 4 Although it may be true
that the monopoly made the company more likely to treat
customers badly, there was no allegation in Jackson that the
government intended this consequence when the monopoly
was issued, and there was certainly no allegation that the
government intended the particular consequence of a
procedural due process violation.
2. When is State Involvement During or After the
Violation Sufficient to Make the Private Action Fairly
Attributable to the State?
When the state influences a private deprivation after the
fact, for instance, by upholding or enforcing the deprivation,
ordinary enforcement or adjudication is not sufficient to
transform a private deprivation into state action. An officer's
or a judge's actions of simply upholding a law are insufficient
to convert a private party into a state actor. Instead, for the
deprivation to be fairly attributable to the state, a state must
give special assistance, over and above ordinary law
enforcement, to further the deprivation. This rule mirrors
the permission and encouragement distinction discussed
above. In both cases, it is not enough for the state to treat the
214. As an aside, there is reason to question the Jackson Court's reliance on
Moose Lodge for this point. In Moose Lodge, the dissent stressed that the quota
was full and had been for many years and that the grant of a license was
similar to the grant of a monopoly. This fact, however, was not addressed by
the majority. That might be because it was discovered by Justice Douglas after
the briefs were submitted. Because it was outside the record, it is possible that
the majority did not consider it. In a memo, one of Justice's Blackmun's clerks
wrote that many of the justices would be reluctant to consider the newly
discovered information. Furthermore, the majority opinion stated, "there is no
suggestion in this record that Pennsylvania law, either as written or as applied
discriminates against minority groups either in their right to apply for club
licenses themselves or in their right to purchase and be served liquor in places
of public accommodation." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173
(1972) (emphasis added). If the Moose Lodge majority did not consider the full
quota, its opinion should not be read to say anything about monopolies. Despite
this, two years later, the Jackson Court relied on Moose Lodge to hold that the
grant of a monopoly was not sufficient cooperation to make the private action
fairly attributable to the state. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974).
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private actor as an ordinary citizen; courts will not find state
action unless the state shares the goals of the private
deprivation.
In Black v. Cutter Laboratories, a private company fired
an employee for being an active member of the communist
party. 5  It defended its decision with the employment
contract, which allowed termination for-cause.21 6 The
California Supreme Court upheld the employment contract as
applied, despite the employee's asserted First Amendment
rights. 2 17 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and allowed the
private company to deprive the employee of her First
Amendment rights.2 18 In doing so, it implicitly held that the
California Supreme Court's decision allowing the deprivation
did not make the employer's conduct fairly attributable to the
state.219
Cutter Laboratories is different than a situation where
the state gives the private party more assistance with the
deprivation than it would give an ordinary citizen. In Adickes
v. Kress, for example, a white schoolteacher wished to eat
lunch with six of her black students at the Kress restaurant
in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 2 0 She was denied service as a
215. Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 293 (1956).
216. Id. at 293-95.
217. Id. at 295.
218. Id. at 300.
219. The Cutter Laboratories opinion is also interesting in that it examines
whether the California Supreme Court violated the federal Constitution by
holding for the employer. This inquiry was entirely separate from the question
of whether the court decision made the private violation fairly attributable to
the state. At the time Cutter Laboratories was decided, a court decision itself
could violate constitutional rights, independently of an alleged private
deprivation. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). There was no question
that in Cutter Laboratories, just as in Shelley, the court was a state actor. The
question was whether the court violated substantive constitutional guarantees.
On this point, the Cutter Laboratories majority distinguished Shelley, holding
that the California Supreme Court's holding was constitutional, despite extreme
anti-communist language. The U.S. Supreme Court stated,
This Court . . . reviews judgments, not statements in opinions. At
times, the atmosphere in which an opinion is written may become so
surcharged that unnecessarily broad statements are made. In such a
case, it is our duty to look beyond the broad sweep of the language and
determine for ourselves precisely the ground on which the judgment
rests. This means no more than that we should not pass on federal
questions discussed in the opinion where it appears that the judgment
rests on adequate state grounds.
Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. at 297-98 (citations omitted).
220. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 147-48 (1970).
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"[white person] in the company of Negroes."2 21 When the
teacher left the restaurant, a police officer who had witnessed
the controversy arrested her on "a groundless charge of
vagrancy."22 2 The Court held that the "Kress employee, in the
course of employment, and [the] Hattiesburg policeman
somehow reached an understanding to deny Miss Adickes
service in the Kress store, or to cause her subsequent arrest
because she was a white person in the company of
Negroes." 2 23 The state's special assistance was sufficient to
subject the private action to constitutional scrutiny because it
was not a normal arrest made because of a violation of a
law. 224 Rather, the arrest was made because the state official
colluded with the restaurant's discriminatory views.225
Special assistance is, in many ways, like encouragement.
Both standards look at the ways the state ratified the specific
violation, not the ways that the state ratified the actions of
the private actor generally. Also, both look to the subjective
intent of the responsible state officials, sometimes proven
objectively, to determine whether state action is present.
Finally, and most importantly, both require that the state do
more than treat the depriver like an ordinary citizen; the
state must favor the depriver's action over other actions.
Admittedly, the rule that mere enforcement of a
previously existing law is not sufficient cooperation to create
state action is inconsistent with the Court's decision in Lugar
v. Edmondson.226 In Lugar, a private creditor followed a
statutory self-help procedure to attach a debtor's property.
Unlike the self-help statute in Flagg Brothers, the statute in
Lugar required the creditor to get a writ of prejudgment
attachment from the court and then use the sheriff to enforce
the writ.2 27  The debtor sued the creditor for violating his
procedural due process rights.2 2 8 The creditor objected that it
was a private actor, not subject to constitutional scrutiny.
The Court held that state action exists when: (1) "the
deprivation [is] caused by the exercise of some right or
221. Id. at 148.
222. Id. at 149.
223. Id. at 152.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
227. Id. at 924.
228. Id. at 925.
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privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible," and (2) "the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor." 29  Therefore, because the legislature set forth the
procedure beforehand and because the sheriff assisted the
creditor in the deprivation, the deprivation was fairly
attributable to the state.23 0
By helping the creditor, the sheriff merely permitted the
creditor to invoke the law. The sheriff was not, as in Adickes,
conspiring with the creditor to reach some common goal.23 1
As Justice Burger pointed out in dissent, "[the creditor] did no
more than invoke a presumptively valid state prejudgment
attachment procedure available to all."2 3 2 "Invoking a judicial
process, of course, implicates the State and its officers but
does not transform essentially private conduct into actions of
the State."3 Justice Powell similarly emphasized the
ordinary law enforcement relationship between the sheriff
and the creditor: "There is no allegation that respondent
conspired with state officials to deny petitioner the fair
protection of state or federal law."123  His dissent argued that
the majority's holding-that a private citizen, who did no
more than commence a legal action of a kind traditionally
initiated by private parties, thereby engaged in "state
action"-was absurd. 23 5
Lugar, taken to its limit, implies that when the state
enforces previously existing laws that allow a private citizen
to deprive another of constitutional rights, there is sufficient
state cooperation to make the private action subject to the
Constitution. Such a rule could not withstand one of the most
powerful objections to the state action doctrine: "Anyone who
believes that his or her rights have been violated can sue in
state court. If the court dismisses the case because the state
229. Id. at 937-39.
230. Id. at 937.
231. Id. at 944 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("There is no allegation that
respondent conspired with state officials to deny petitioner the fair protection of
state or federal law.").
232. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 943 (1982) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
233. Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)).
234. Id. at 944 (Powell, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
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law does not forbid the violation, there is state action
sustaining the infringement of the right. ."2 If, as Lugar
held, ordinary law enforcement is sufficient cooperation,
the state action doctrine becomes protean.
Although narrowly reading Lugar to hold only that police
enforcement, not court action, is state action, would address
the protean objection, this interpretation has its own
problems. First, Lugar relied on the fact that defendant used
a court to issue an ex parte writ of attachment. 2 3 8 Second, a
rule allowing private parties to violate constitutional norms
only in the absence of police involvement would have strange
results. Private parties would have an incentive to take the
law into their own hands and settle disputes without the
assistance of police or other state enforcement institutions.
Furthermore, if police involvement, but not court
enforcement, was sufficient cooperation, only those strong
enough to violate constitutional rights without calling upon
the police would be immune from suit. Assume, for example,
that there are two identical shopping centers. One is large
and well-established, and the other is new and on shaky
financial ground. Animal rights advocates arrive at both
shopping centers and begin to protest. The large shopping
center uses private security to remove the protesters, but the
small shopping center has no choice but to call the police.
Under Lugar, the small shopping center would be liable for
violating the Constitution but the large shopping center
would not. Rather than attempt to fit Lugar into our
approach to state action, we accept that case as an outlier
because of these problems.23 9
D. Illustrating the Consistent Applicability of the Theory
The Court has already accepted and fleshed out many of
the separate pieces of the above approach. However, it has
never applied it as a comprehensive whole. For that reason,
lower courts have had little to work with when they decide
236. Erwin Chemerinsky, State Action, 618 PLI/LIT 183, 210 (1999).
237. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940-42.
238. Id.
239. Furthermore, the main issue in Lugar was whether the "under color of"
law requirement of §1983 and the state action doctrine were identical. Id. at
939-42. Most of the justices' notes were dedicated to that issue. It is possible,
then, that the state action implications were simply overlooked.
926 (Vol:51
MAKING SENSE OF STATE ACTION
novel state action cases. To illustrate how lower courts might
use the conceptual approach to state action proposed in this
article in a logical and comprehensive manner, this Part will
walk through this approach using the facts of Mendez v.
Belton,2 40 a case actually decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1984.
Dr. Mendez worked at the Public Health Services'
Outpatient Clinic in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and performed
services in concert with her employment at Presbyterian
Hospital. 2 4 1 Presbyterian Hospital was a private, non-profit
corporation, tax-exempt, and subject to extensive federal
health care regulations.24 2 The hospital received financial
assistance through the Hill-Burton program for an addition to
the hospital; it also received Medicare and Medicaid funds.243
The hospital maintained detailed requirements for staff
membership.2 44
In December of 1978, Dr. Mendez received a letter from
Dr. Belton, the Chief of Clinical Services at the Clinic. 245 The
letter criticized her for allegedly performing unnecessary
surgery on two Clinic patients at Presbyterian Hospital and
neglecting to follow various Public Health Services
Regulations.2 46  Dr. Belton also sent copies of this letter to
administrators and doctors at Presbyterian Hospital.24 7 The
medical director at Presbyterian Hospital requested that Dr.
Mendez respond to the letter.248 She responded, denying the
allegations.24 9 She was nevertheless suspended from the
hospital staff and was unsuccessful in her appeals to the
hospital's Judicial Review Committee and Board of
Directors.25 0 She filed suit alleging that the hospital was a
public actor and that it had violated federal law and her
constitutional rights.25 ' She also alleged that Dr. Belton was
a federal official and that he had violated her equal protection
240. Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984).
241. Id. at 17.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 18.
244. Id. at 17.
245. Id.
246. Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1984).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 18.
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rights under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause by
discriminating against her on the basis of race.252
The first step in the state action inquiry is to identify
whose and what conduct is at issue. Dr. Mendez made two
allegations. First, she alleged that Dr. Belton racially
discriminated against her. Here, Dr. Belton was the relevant
actor, and the racial discrimination was the relevant action.
Second, she alleged that the hospital deprived her of due
process by revoking her staff privileges. For that allegation,
the hospital was the relevant actor, and the revocation was
the relevant action. These allegations must be analyzed
separately to determine the existence of state action.
As to the allegation that Dr. Belton discriminated against
Dr. Mendez, the second step of analysis asks whether Dr.
Belton, the relevant actor, was public in nature. Dr. Belton
was a Public Health Service Official, a government employee,
acting in the course of his job as the Director of Clinical
Services. As a governmental actor acting in a public capacity,
Dr. Belton was a public actor and his actions were state
actions subject to constitutional scrutiny. Because this step is
determinative, the state action inquiry regarding Dr. Belton
is complete. The only remaining question is whether Dr.
Bolton's conduct violated the substantive guarantees of the
Constitution.
We ask the same second-step question with regard to the
allegation that the hospital deprived Dr. Mendez of due
process. If the hospital was either governmental or acting in
a public capacity, the hospital was a state actor and its
actions were subject to constitutional scrutiny. Unlike Dr.
Belton, the hospital was not governmental. The hospital was
nominally private, and there was no evidence that the
government ran or controlled the hospital. Furthermore, the
hospital was not acting in a public capacity. In order to find
that the hospital was acting in a public capacity, the court
would have to find that the provision of health care was a
service traditionally and exclusively reserved for the state.
Given the long history of private companies offering health
care facilities, this was not the case. As a nongovernmental
actor acting in a private capacity, therefore, the hospital was
a private party.
252. Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1984).
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Because the hospital was private in nature, the inquiry
moves to a third step to determine whether the government
was sufficiently wound up with the hospital's deprivation to
make that deprivation fairly attributable to the state. In this
step, we ask whether the state encouraged the revocation of
Dr. Mendez's staff privileges before the fact. Even though it
was a private actor, the hospital might still have been subject
to the Constitution if the state had encouraged or specially
assisted the hospital's revocation of Dr. Mendez's staff
privileges.
Here, the government regulated and funded the hospital
as part of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and under the
Hill-Burton act for construction of an addition. In doing so,
however, the government did not necessarily intend to make
the revocation of Dr. Mendez's staff privileges more likely.
There was no subjective proof that the government intended
for the hospital to revoke Dr. Mendez's staff privileges.
Furthermore, the government had no interest in whether Dr.
Mendez's privileges were revoked, so it would be difficult to
prove intent objectively. It appears the government's actions
were neutral as to whether the hospital should terminate Dr
Mendez's privileges.25 3 The hospital, not the government,
controlled personnel decisions and maintained detailed
staffing requirements. Since the state did not take a
normative stance or act to make it more likely that the
hospital would terminate Dr. Mendez, its position cannot be
said to have encouraged the termination. Thus, the hospital's
revocation of Dr. Mendez's privileges is not fairly attributable
to the state, nor is it subject to constitutional scrutiny.2 54
253. It is interesting to note that Dr. Mendez actually alleged a greater
governmental influence on the hospital's staffing practices. Id. at 18. She
alleged, without citation to the record, that "the Puerto Rico Government
Development Bank approved the financing for the new wing of the hospital on
the condition that the ho[splital maintain a staff subject to the approval of the
bank." Id. She further alleged that this information was absent from the record
because the hospital refused to comply with discovery requests, including those
ordered by the court. Ultimately, the Court found this information unimportant
to its decision. This information is interesting, however, because this is
precisely the type of funding that might indicate encouragement, not just
permission, on the part of the state.
254. The First Circuit's state action inquiry ultimately came to the same
conclusion as if it applied this new approach-that Dr. Belton was a state actor,
but the hospital was not. Id. at 18-20. With regard to the hospital, the First
Circuit came to its decision simply by citing to other lower court cases that
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The case of Dr. Mendez is just one of endless factual
scenarios that may be analyzed under the proposed state
action approach. This conceptual structure could feasibly be
applied to every conceivable factual scenario that requires a
state action inquiry. The approach is also useful because it is
consistent with the bulk of Supreme Court precedent, and it
is able to withstand the myriad critiques of the state action
doctrine and its application presented above.
III. DEFENDING THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
Because the conceptual structure laid out in Part II of
this article arises from Supreme Court precedent, it is no
surprise that it is consistent with the bulk of that case law.
The real challenge for such a structure is whether it
withstands the criticisms of a comprehensive state action
doctrine that have been presented over the years. This Part
attempts to defend the theory against the three broad
categories of state action criticism that were presented in
Part I.
First, as discussed, commentators argue that any state
action doctrine is limitless because states are never wholly
removed from private conduct, and accordingly, all action is
state action. Since private rights are based in state law, and
state adjudication and enforcement is state action, every
private action has some root in state action. Because states
"act" when they implicitly or explicitly compel, encourage,
permit, or forbid behavior, and when they make and enforce
judgments, some scholars have argued every action is
attributable to the state.
This objection would certainly apply to some theories of
state action; however, the state action doctrine is not
necessarily protean just because the state is always in some
way involved with private behavior. To successfully confront
this objection, a state action doctrine must separate state
found funding and regulation to be inadequate for a state action finding. Id. at
18. Although this approach led the court to the same conclusion here, as
presented it could have accounted for non-neutral funding and regulation that
had the specific impact of encouraging the revocation of Dr. Mendez's
privileges-the kind of funding alleged but not cited to by Dr. Mendez. Thus,
we find that even this case illustrates the flexibility of this approach to account
for any factual nuances that might be present and relevant to the state action
inquiry.
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involvement that is sufficient to attribute private action to
the state from state involvement that is not.
This article's theory makes this separation in its third
step of the analysis. The third step draws a clear line
between those actions that encourage the private behavior
and those actions that merely permit it. Similarly, it
distinguishes between ordinary enforcement and special
assistance when the state becomes involved after the fact.
This article's approach recognizes the pervasiveness of state
actions, but it distinguishes those actions that encourage or
provide special assistance to private actors from those that
are merely permissive or the result of ordinary enforcement.
The state's involvement will not be sufficient to make the
private action a state action when the state merely treats the
private actor as it would any member of society-for example
by allowing him to exercise common law or statutory rights or
by allowing him to invoke the judicial processes to protect
those rights. In the ordinary situation, then, the state's
cooperation will not be enough to make the private action
fairly attributable to the state.
Second, because the state action question arises in
limitless factual scenarios and the Court's state action
jurisprudence has been seemingly inconsistent, commentators
have argued that it is impossible to reduce to a single
approach. As a result, they have found the state-action
doctrine to be a "conceptual disaster area" and a "muddled
mess."2 55 They argue that the factual situations where the
state action inquiry arises are so varied that no single
principle can meaningfully determine whether state action
exists in all circumstances. Although the Court has
developed a number of tests to deal with divergent scenarios,
it has not explained when lower courts should use a
particular line of precedent.
The wide variation of factual scenarios where any state
action doctrine must apply does make it more difficult to
frame a workable doctrine; however, it also makes doing so
all the more important. The wider the variation of factual
scenarios, the more difficult it is for lower courts to rely on
analogical device. This article's theory applies to any of the
wide variety of possible factual scenarios. It does this by
255. See supra notes 5, 6, 7, 9 and accompanying text.
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using a set of principles, rather than a single test. It engages
in several inquiries, dependant on the facts of the particular
case that are intended to encompass the various principles
underlying the objectives of the state action doctrine, and
thus applies to any of the various factual scenarios where a
state action question is presented. The theory's major
contribution is that it instructs lower courts how to link
together the Supreme Court's divergent lines of inquiry. Put
differently, it answers the question of when to use a
particular test.
Third and finally, commentators argue that the clearer
the state action doctrine, the easier it will be for public
entities to find loopholes to evade constitutional scrutiny and
that a comprehensive state action doctrine will underprotect
civil rights and liberties. We have sought to create a theory of
state action that is sufficiently comprehensive to thwart
attempts to circumvent constitutional scrutiny. A public
entity could not simply create and control a private entity to
avoid constitutional application, for example. In such a case,
our theory would deem the technically private entity to be
public. Furthermore, under our theory, there would be state
action in any situation where the public entity intended to
make a private deprivation more likely. Any attempt to
circumvent constitutional review would inevitably involve
such intent. Additionally, since our theory takes into account
the historical and extra-legal context as well as the state's
intentions, any social or political movements, like those of the
Warren Court Era, enabling states to discriminate under the
cover of private action will be discovered and found to be state
action under the third step in the analysis. Ultimately,
however, no theory of constitutional interpretation can
prevent all wrongdoers from circumventing or evading the
law all the time. The ability of wrongdoers to understand the
limits of the law along with other citizens is a function of the
law itself.
This article simply does not address the normative
concern of whether there should be a state action doctrine in
the first instance. Rather, it acknowledges that a state action
doctrine exists, and within that confine, tries to develop a
theory that is usable. It does, however, attempt to address
the structural objection that is implicated by the normative
objection: that rigid state action tests, only applicable in
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particular situations, fail to protect civil rights. These rigid
tests fail to cover those situations that fall close to but outside
the tests. This theory has particular strength when looking
at cases from the United States Courts of Appeal that tend to
find state action only where the particular factual situation
has been addressed by the Supreme Court. Our theory,
because it uses a spectrum of relationships, or a simple bar
for action, is not susceptible to this criticism. Every possible
state-private relationship will fall somewhere along the
spectrum. The fact that the particular factual situation has
not been previously addressed does not matter. Since
placement on the spectrum, or a relationship that is special in
nature, is determinative of the state action question, the
spectrum approach guarantees that state-private
relationships amounting to state action will not be excused
for failing several separate and distinct tests. Furthermore,
although this theory does not hold independently powerful
private actors to constitutional stringency, it does provide
flexibility, holding those private actors accountable for
constitutional violations when they act in concert with state
actors.
Though this theory does not address every concern
presented against state action theories, it fares well against
the broad categories of criticism traditionally presented.
Other criticisms might arise over time, such as that the
spectrum lends itself to becoming a mechanical and inflexible
placement of distinct categories next to one another, leaving
no room for blending between the categories. To the extent
that these criticisms are foreseeable and damaging, this
article has attempted to address them. In addition to
withstanding the traditional criticisms of state action
theories, this theory also comprehensively explains the
Supreme Court cases on state action and provides a workable
tool for lower court analysis.
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